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ABSTRACT
This paper examines broadly the doctrine of unconscionability and 
analyzes to what extent business as well as consumer contracts in 
Malaysia do not preclude the possibility of unconscionability and 
unethical bargains. The commercial or business to business contracts 
look into the relationship in agency and franchising while the 
consumer contracts specifically relate to the sales of goods, consumer 
credit as well as sales and purchase of housing. These commercial and 
consumer contracts are commonly adhesion in nature and are getting 
more complex in the modern world. This paper would also suggest 
the statutory requirement of conscionable conduct in all its variation 
in both the formation as well as performance of commercial and 
consumer contracts generally. The variation of conscionable conduct 
refers to conducts that are fair and made in good faith or without undue 
influence, gross inequality or presumed dishonesty.
Keywords: Unconscionability, Unethical Business Practices, Business-
To-Business Contract and Consumer Contract
INTRODUCTION
Conducts and bargains that are considered inequitable in contractual relationships 
have always become the subject of legal scrutiny as these situations suggest that 
contractual justice has been compromised.  In order to deal with such a situation, 
special equitable rules such as unconscionability, good faith, undue influence, 
inequality of bargaining position and fair dealing have been developed.  Despite 
the several rules available to deal with inequitable conduct, it will appear that the 
rule of unconscionability is of a wider application.
Unconscionability is understood by jurists as a doctrine used by the court 
of equity to correct men’s conscience against conducts and bargains that are 
unconscionable.  This understanding is derived from the judgments in several early 
Any remaining errors or omissions rest solely with the author (s) of this paper.
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English cases including the Earl of Oxford’s Case (1615), Earl of Chesterfield v 
Janssen (1751) and Earl of Aylesford v Morris (1873).  Until now, inspiring writings 
and discussions have been made concerning the supposed or probable definition, 
description, criteria and application of the doctrine.  Impliedly, it means that the 
uncertain nature of the doctrine does not deter its significance in promoting and 
achieving contractual justice; a prominent theory in contract law apart from the 
theory of freedom of contract.
In Malaysia, the doctrine of unconscionability is considered as still at its 
infancy but the awareness of the existence of this doctrine seems to be gaining 
ground.  As diverse forms of businesses and relationships also exist in Malaysia, 
it is probable that the business as well as consumer contracts in Malaysia do not 
preclude the possibility of unconscionability and unethical bargains.  There are two 
types of contractual relationships; contracts between businesspersons and contracts 
between businessperson and consumer.  Both are the produce of human creativity to 
satisfy their wants and needs.  In this paper, the commercial or business to business 
contracts look into the relationship in agency and franchising while the consumer 
contracts specifically relate to the sales of goods, consumer credit as well as sales 
and purchase of housing.  These commercial and consumer contracts are commonly 
adhesion in nature and are getting more complex in the modern world.
This paper presents the new parameters of the doctrine of unconscionability in 
the law of contract.  The new parameters will then be used to explain the possibility 
of unconscionable and unethical bargains in business and consumer contracts. 
This paper also suggests the statutory requirement of conscionable conduct in 
all its variation in both the formation as well as performance of commercial and 
consumer contract generally.
PARAMETERS OF THE DOCTRINE OF 
UNCONSCIONABILITY
Unconscionability is a prime element in contractual justice without which 
contractual justice cannot stand firmly as a theory in the law of contract.   As a prime 
element in contractual justice, unconscionability should be placed as an essential 
doctrine in the law of contract.  The modern law of contract is a marriage between 
common law and equity.  Common lawyers prefer the test of reasonableness over 
fairness in the law of contract.  This preference entails unconscionability although 
unconscionability is a creature of equity.
Inequitability connotes the unfair or unjust practice, which is against the 
contractual justice, while unethicality relates to the immoral practice.  At a first 
glance, morality stands in a different ground from contractual justice but borrowing 
the word of HLA Hart (1961), justice is a specific idea within the general sphere of 
morality.  Therefore, justice may sometimes collide with the other ideas of morality 
including ethics.  The pursuit of achieving contractual justice is clear within the 
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doctrine of unconscionability and its parameters that include fairness, good faith and 
fair dealing, undue influence and, in certain circumstances, inequality of bargaining 
position and honesty are also concomitant to ensure an ethical bargain.  Since the 
limits of unconscionability can be ascertained by these factors, the claim by Cooke 
and Oughton (2000) that unconscionability is devoid of real content, therefore, could 
not stand.  The developments in the respective factors do not remove them from 
being part of unconscionability.  Instead they will feed unconscionability.
Special position or disadvantage is not a pre-condition for unconscionability 
but its existence gives unconscionability the more reason to exist.  It is particularly 
useful when the mechanism used to determine unconscionability is undue influence 
and gross inequality; less or of no use in good faith and fair dealing.  The special 
disadvantage refers to the condition or situation of the party that makes his position 
more disadvantageous than other contracting parties in the same situation.
In order to allow a broader commercial application of the notion of special 
disadvantage, it is proposed here to adopt the view by the Federal Court of Australia 
in ACCC v. Samton Holdings Pty. Ltd. and Others1 that special disadvantage can 
occur as a result of either situational disadvantage or constitutional disadvantage.  It 
is ‘special’ because it adds to the disadvantage position and contributes to justify the 
conscionability of the commercial transaction among businesspersons.  This means 
that the adaptation of special disadvantageous is according to the circumstances 
of each particular case and the use of reasonableness is necessary to substantiate 
a fair valuation of the case.
From one perspective, it is arguable that because of the existence of special 
disadvantage of a party or the parties’ inequality, good faith should be an inherent 
factor.  However, such argument means a direct importation of civil law’s concept 
of good faith in contracts to common law.  Compared to good faith, the doctrine of 
unconscionability was brought to life at the common law jurisdiction.  In spite of the 
ambiguities and diverse views in relation to its nature and scope, unconscionability 
has its root firmly ground at common law.
Presumed dishonesty in the sense of equitable fraud emphasizes on the 
existence of special position or disadvantage of a party contracting along with the 
unconscientious use of the power, or extortion or unfair advantage taken.  This view 
is derived from the explanations of equitable fraud by Lord Selborne in Earl of 
Aylesford v. Morris2 and of presumed dishonesty in the Halsbury’s law of Malaysia 
(2005).  Therefore, the statement made by Gopal Sri Ram JCA in Saad Marwi v 
Chan Hwan Hua & Anor that “English equity jurisprudence does in fact recognize 
a wider doctrine of unconscionable bargains as a species of equitable fraud”3 is not 
followed.  Rather, the existence of presumed dishonesty or equitable fraud shows, 
1 (2002) 189 ALR 76 at 92.
2 (1873) LR 8 Ch App 484, 490-491.
3 [2001] 3 CLJ 98 at 114-115 (CA).
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as stated in The Earl of Chesterfield v Janssen, the “intrinsic unconscionableness 
of the bargain.”4
Arguments against applying the doctrine of unconscionability to commercial 
transactions rest upon the issues of uncertainty as well as the financial impact upon 
business.  Again, it should be noted that certainty requires that contractual duty will 
not arise outside the terms of the agreement.  Apart from the question of certainty 
of contract, achieving contractual justice via unconscionability will result in greater 
efficiency in the contract by reducing the cost of avoiding non-compliance.  For 
example, if ‘A’ knows that he can contract with ‘B’ and the law will protect him 
if ‘B’ behaves unconscionably, ‘A’ will be more willing to contract.  The contract 
will not become more complicated, rigid or involving prolonged negotiation.  The 
process of the contract will become more efficient.
In relation to the financial impact upon business, it would cause the business 
to be unduly stopped or terminated because of the finding of unconscionability. 
There is a truth in the argument if unconscionability is applied on the reasoning 
of inequality of bargaining position without considering whether there is gross 
inequality, in the circumstances.  However, it is arguable that this claim is 
usually made by or on behalf of the stronger businesspersons or unscrupulous 
businesspersons to protect what they call as their legitimate business interests. 
The yardstick to determine the legitimate as opposed to the illegitimate seems to 
be based upon fairness and honesty, which in fact relates to good faith.5  It is also 
valid to claim that both parties in a contract can argue that they have their own 
separate legitimate business interests.  In practice, it is unlikely that a commercial 
contract between businesspersons will be left absolutely undisturbed by law in 
cases where gross inequality of bargaining power occurs or lack of good faith and 
fair dealing and/or dishonesty are proven, unless the courts’ focus is only upon 
attaining freedom of contract.
Unconscionability as a ground to seek relief is very dependent on the 
independent factors causing unconscionability.  This means that unconscionability 
by itself is not a basis of any specific relief.  It is a doctrine describing the lack 
of quality of the transaction and the lack of that quality maybe caused by some 
independent factors as discussed above.  If, for example, the unconscionability 
were because of unfairness, lack of good faith, lack of fair dealing, undue influence 
or gross inequality, one should go to those independent factors to seek relief. 
Therefore, the remedy for unconscionability will depend on the remedy that is 
available for the factors that caused that unconscionability.
4 (1751) 2 Ves Sen 157; 28 ER 82 at 101.
5 Conaglen is right when he notes legitimate interests as the basic concept for the duty of good faith 
but his argument is unsound when he want to unite other doctrines like duress, undue influence and 
unconscionable bargains under the concept of good faith using legitimacy as the reason: MDJ Conaglen 
‘Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable Bargains – The Theoretical Mesh’ (1999) 18 NZ Uni 
L Rev 509, 541.
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POSSIBILITY OF UNCONSCIONABLE AND UNETHICAL 
PRACTICES
Business Contracts
Agency
There are many business contracts that are actually carried out by the agents on 
behalf of or representing the principals.  These agents are recognised in law by 
reason of the creation of the partnership and employment agreement or by reason 
of necessity and holding out.  The law of agency in Malaysia is prescribed in Part 
X of the Contracts Act, 1950 (CA).  The statutory provisions generally regulate 
the appointment and authority of agents, duties of the agent and principal inter se, 
and effect of agency on contract with third parties.  The CA, however, does not 
oust the expressly or impliedly agreed rights and duties of the principal and agent.6 
This situation can be inferred as Part X of the CA is silent on this matter.  It is also 
understood that the CA is not a Code and is a statute of general application; hence 
parties to contract are free to determine their agreed terms.
Section 141(2) of the CA prescribes that the extent of an agent’s authority is 
to do every lawful thing necessary for the purpose, or usually done in the course of 
conducting such business.  It is clear that the guiding factor is what is lawful and 
necessary, which is subjective, or usually done in such business, which is objective. 
An agent, therefore, cannot act unlawfully.  Section 24(e) of the CA prescribes that 
the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless the court regards it as 
immoral, or opposed to the public policy.  An agreement is unlawful when the court 
regards a particular consideration, which can be in the form of an act, abstinence or 
promise,7 or object of an agreement as immoral.  Illustration (j) to section 24 shows 
an example of unethical or immoral behaviour of a solicitor.  In that Illustration, 
a solicitor, A, promises to exercise his influence over B, his client, in favour of C 
who promises to pay him $1,000 for the effort.  Therefore, in relation to unlawful 
agreement, immorality in Malaysia is much wider than the common law notion 
and includes unethical bargains.
In addition to that, from the agency law perspective, Illustration (j) also shows 
that the solicitor who is the agent to the client promises to make secret profit out 
of the performance of his duty.  Such conduct falls under the ambit of presumed 
dishonesty.  In TH Mahesan s/o Thambiah v Malaysia Government Officers’ Co-
operative Housing Society, Ltd [1979] AC 374, it is a well settled law that an agent 
should not act dishonestly.  In this case the director of a housing society who received 
a bribe entitled the principal to recover the amount of bribe and damages for the 
whole loss suffered by it as the result of the fraudulent transaction.
6 This rule is the same as common law, see AG Guest Anson’s Law of Contract, p.543.
7 Section 2(d) of the CA.
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In Wong Mun Wai v Wong Tham Fatt and Anor [1987] 2 MLJ 249, the court 
found that the first defendant failed in his duty as agent of the plaintiff when he 
sold the plaintiff’s half share of land well below market value and when he failed 
to inform the plaintiff that he had sold it to the second defendant who was his 
wife.  According to the court, the first defendant had a duty to act in good faith in 
protecting the interests of the plaintiff and could not use his position as agent to 
profit at the plaintiff’s expense.
Both of the above cases show that unconscionable and unethical bargains could 
occur in agency.  The agent’s unconscionable and unethical bargains are implied in 
his equitable fraud or dishonest act of making secret profit or his lack of good faith 
in failing to give material information of the transaction to his principal.
Unconscionability is also a reason for estoppel to exist.  According to Finn 
(1994), unconscionability in the specific field of equitable estoppel is used in the 
sense that “equity will prevent an unconscionable insistence on strict legal rights 
… [and] are conditioned upon the explicit finding of unconscionable conduct in 
the person against whom they are invoked.” It should be noted that estoppel claim 
would also exist in an agency by holding out.  This principle is succinctly explained 
by Tan Sri Datuk Edgar Joseph Jr, SCJ in Cheng Hang Guan & Ors. v Perumahan 
Farlim (Penang) Sdn. Bhd. & Ors. [1994] 1 CLJ 19:
“The doctrine of “holding out”, sometimes called apparent or ostensible 
authority, has been said to be based upon estoppel.  Agency by estoppel 
arises where one person has so acted - and this he may do by allowing 
the agent to hold himself out as having authority as to lead another to 
believe that he has authorised a third person to act on his behalf, and 
that other, in such belief, enters into transactions with the third persons 
within the scope of his ostensible authority.  The onus rests on the person 
dealing with the agent to establish real or ostensible authority… it 
would be unconscionable for a party to be permitted to deny that which, 
knowingly or unknowingly, he has allowed or encouraged another to 
assume to his detriment….”
Franchising
Franchising relationship is different from other forms of business relationships 
because it is a hybrid of several bodies of laws that make it a unique form of 
relationship.  In Malaysia, complaints by the franchisors or franchisees on breach of 
a particular clause in the franchising agreement or any unfair practices in franchising 
can be brought to the Registrar of Franchises, the Malaysian Franchise Association 
or the court.  The first two channels encourage mediation as an alternative form of 
dispute resolution.  In fact, many franchising complaints are actually settled out of 
court because it is deemed that mediation will provide amicable resolution through 
innovative business arrangements (Miranda, 1997).
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It is found that franchising is also open to unconscionable and unethical bargains 
due to its relational nature.  Coratta (1992) reminds us that franchising is structurally 
vulnerable to conflicts, while Adams and Jones (1990) agree that franchising lends 
itself to a number of frauds and sharp practices.  One of the measures apparently 
adopted by Malaysia in order to control these negative bargains is by prescribing 
the franchisors to provide disclosure documents so that prospective franchisees 
can have the full view of the franchise business.  This requirement is impliedly a 
requirement of good faith and fair dealing.  In other words, failure to provide such 
document and dishonesty in the disclosure is unconscionable.
According to Iglesias (2004), a certain degree of good faith is required in the 
relationship.  The various views on the scope or meaning of good faith seemingly 
point to the duty to act fairly, honestly and reasonably to the other (Waddams,1995; 
Steyn,1997; Stack,1999; and Peden, 2003).  The requirement to act honestly is in 
fact available under section 29(1) of the Franchise Act 1998 (FA).
Caruso (2003) points out that franchising agreement was drafted by the 
franchisor and for the franchisor.  The standard form agreements drafted by 
franchisors commonly include the franchisors’ unilateral decisions rights, which 
equipped them with the ability to deal with contingencies during the performance of 
the franchise contract.  Although the obvious reason behind this rights is to protect 
the franchisors’ business interests and to maintain the uniformity of the system, 
franchisors must aware that such unilateral decision must be made “reasonably and 
with proper motive” and not arbitrarily.8  Else, it would be a sign of franchisors’ 
unfair dealing and lacking in good faith for not considering the interests of the 
system as a whole.
It was decided in Zapatha v Dairy Mart that franchise agreement is 
unconscionable if the clause is worded obscurely.  In a case study from the Franchise 
Unit of the Ministry of Entrepreneur and Cooperative Development (MECD), the 
franchisee complained that the franchisor has breached the territorial right that had 
been given to the franchisee according to the franchise agreement.  The franchisor 
had unilaterally decided to open another franchise outlet at a location within an 
area where territorial right has already been given to the franchisee.  The territorial 
right as provided in their franchise agreement is as follows:
“Within a diameter of 5 km (for the purpose of measurement from point 
to point, proper road way available at the point of agreement shall be 
used); or in a “taman” (housing area) with approximately 300 houses; 
or under special circumstances, the territory shall be agreed by the 
franchisor, franchisee and affected parties….”
8 Bonfield v Aamco Transmissions, Inc. 708 F Supp 867 (ND 111 1989).
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The franchisor argued that no breach occurred because he interpreted the given 
territorial right as including all with the usage of  the word ‘or’ in accordance to 
the agreement.  This means that the franchisor had unilaterally interpreted the 
word ‘or’ as conjunctive and not disjunctive.  The Registrar of Franchises agreed 
with him.  However, it can be claimed that the clause on territorial right in the 
franchise agreement above was obscurely worded due to the use of the words ‘or’ 
and ‘special circumstances’.  Such clauses are unconscionable.  There is an unfair 
advantage taken out of the inequality bargaining power and special disadvantage 
of the franchisee.  It is the business concept dependence that causes the franchisees 
to succumb to the terms of agreements drafted by the franchisor.  Such abuse is 
related to gross inequality.
Other examples of gross inequality by the franchisors include the unconscionable 
and unethical practices of franchisors who receives some economic benefit or secret 
rebates from the designated third party supplier on top of any payment received from 
franchisees;9 franchisor restricts certain franchisees from selling certain products or 
offering certain services that are sold or offered by competing franchisees at other 
location; and franchisor only allows selected franchisees to sell products or offer 
services at promotional price.  In fact, section 20 of the Franchise Act 1998 (the FA) 
marks the latter two examples of discriminatory actions as an unfair franchise.
Consumer Contracts
Sale of Goods
The buying and selling of goods is the most common transaction that everyone will 
get involved in almost on a daily basis.  This is the fact of a market economy.  Hence, 
contract of sale of goods is the most fundamental kind of contract for consumers. 
According to Professor Atiyah (1991), the contract of sale of goods is a consensual 
transaction based on an agreement to buy and an agreement to sell.  Despite it being 
consensual, consumers-purchasers are often at the weaker bargaining position. 
Evelyn (1982) points out that this situation is due to the operation of the principle 
of freedom of contract and growing complexity in the market. 
Unconscionable practices in the sale of goods could exist within the method 
of dealings and the transactions.  In a plain contract law term, these are known 
as the procedural and substantive process.  The method of dealings in either 
conventional retail or direct selling would invite unconscionability arguments 
whenever the process at the procedural stage is tainted by the unfairness caused 
by undue influence or gross inequality.
The direct distribution method or direct selling, which includes the door-to-
door plan, party plan, multi-level marketing plan and pyramid plan, is increasingly 
9 Jirna Ltd v Mister Donut of Canada Ltd (1973) 40 DLR (3d) 303.
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becoming a significant distribution channel within Malaysia’s total retail enterprise 
system.10  As opposed to the conventional distribution method, direct selling occurs 
whenever the direct seller or retailer initiates contact with the potential customer 
instead of waiting for customer coming to him.
In direct selling that involves family members and friends as the consumers, 
most transactions are made to preserve their personal relationship.  This ethical 
issue is intertwined with the doctrine of unconscionability when the will of the 
buyer is dominated by the seller to make unwanted purchases that enables the seller 
to gain unfair advantage.
Many multi-level marketing (MLM) plans are pyramid plans if they sell 
opportunity rather than product.  While it is clear that pyramid selling is a fraud, 
many people are still lured into the trap set under the pyramid plan until they are too 
late to discover the truth.11  The disguise of the pyramid scheme can be uncloaked 
by the unconscionability doctrine via the good faith doctrine and unfair dealing.
There are a number of statutes which have been enacted which protect the 
consumer interests in Malaysia.  These are found in the Sale of Goods Act 1957 
(SGA) and the Consumer Protection Act 1999 (CPA).  The SGA followed the 
obsolete English statute that is the English Sale of Goods Act 1893.  The English 
statute has been replaced by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (SGA 1979) and had 
incorporated some changes to the provisions.  It is worthy to note that if some of 
the provisions in the SGA 1979 have been criticized by writers,12 what more of the 
‘obsolete’ Malaysian SGA. 
A study in Hong Kong shows that unconscionability does occur when a seller 
insert terms that are so unfair that can be regarded as unconscionable.13  Likewise, 
unconscionability could occur in Malaysia via the standard form agreement between 
the seller and buyer.  These terms are usually designed to protect the seller only 
against certain liability.
The SGA displaced the unfavorable principle of caveat emptor by having the 
principle of caveat venditor via the inclusion of implied terms in sale transaction. 
However, section 62 of the SGA allows the contracting parties to contract-out or 
exclude the implied terms if they wish.  On one hand, the sanctity of contract is 
being observed by law.  On the other hand, the consumers are being treated unfairly. 
Whether or not unconscionability exists depend upon the existence of the parameters 
of unconscionability in a particular case.  It can be argued that the chances that 
10 See DSAM ‘What is Direct Selling?’ at  <http://www.dsam.org.my>  as at  2/12/2008.
11 Pyramid schemes scam: Colombians have lost hundreds of millions of dollars in pyramid schemes 
that are collapsing around the country-14 Nov 2008, 7:10am by ONENEWS at <http:tvnz.co.nz/view/
page/411366/2308292> as at 2/12/2008.
12 See Roger Tan Kor Mee ‘The Need to Amend Sections 13 and 14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979’ 
[1990] 2 CLJ xviii.
13 The Law Reform of Hong Kong (February 1990) “Report on Sale of Goods and Supply of Services 
[Topic 21]” at <http:// www.hkreform.org> as at 20/11/2008.
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unconscionability might occur would be greater when the statutory protection is 
chosen to be excluded by the sellers.  Unscrupulous sellers could then easily employ 
tactics that allow them to sell more goods without violating the SGA.
For instance, section 16(1)(a) of the SGA provides that there is an implied 
condition that goods must be fit for the particular purpose for which the goods are 
acquired.  In Frost v Aylesbury Dairy Co. Ltd [1905] 1 KB 608, the seller was held 
liable for the typhoid-infected milk that caused death to the buyer.  If in similar case 
a seller contract-out the implied term that the goods sold is on ‘as is’ basis, relying 
on the SGA will not assists the consumer.  The consumer would need to seek the 
protection of the CPA where section 6 of the CPA prohibits any contracting out 
in the agreement.  However, Geraint Howells, et. al. (2007) apparently points out 
there could be ways or tactics undertaken by sellers to undermine such statutory 
protection.  These tactics could be in the form of less direct approaches relating to 
the time when those terms have to be complied with, such as a term that openly seek 
to say that the obligations as to quality or fitness only apply prior to installation, 
or a term deeming the consumer to have been made aware of defects relevant to 
the acceptable quality standards. 
The melamine scandal involving melamine added to food products is meant 
to make it appear that it has higher protein content than what it actually contains. 
Malaysian law does give protection to consumers against unsafe goods via section 
23 of the CPA.  In addition to the CPA, the authorities should consider the law on 
labeling of the product.  The weak labeling law caused melamine can be subsumed 
under other instances.  The harm would only be known after the goods are consumed 
or after the ingredients are scientifically tested, which is a waste of both time and 
money.  It should be made clear that the reason for a better law is to protect the 
consumers against the unscrupulous practice of manufacturers and sellers.
Consumer Credit
Contracts for consumer credit involve moneylending, hire-purchase, pawnbroking 
and banking.  It appears that consumers entering into these borrowing and lending 
transactions often faced informational disadvantages and unwarranted consequences 
if the transaction fails (McBride, 2003).  These transactions are also frequently 
characterized by unconscionable and unethical practices which are harsh, unjust 
or contain unfair terms.
Moneylendingi. 
Moneylending activities in Malaysia are regulated under the Moneylenders Act, 
1951 (MA).  The MA was patterned after the English Moneylenders Act 1900 which 
was enacted to curb the increasingly unconscionable practices of moneylending 
particularly in the case of unsecured loans.  Section 21 of the MA empowers the 
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court to reopen a moneylending transaction where the Court is satisfied that the 
interest charged is excessive and that the transaction is harsh and unconscionable 
or substantially unfair.
Prior to the MA, it was held in Chait Singh v. Budin b. Abdullah14 that a 
presumption of unconscionability occurred in a moneylending transaction with a 
good collateral security which the defendant, an illiterate farmer, had to provide to 
the plaintiff because the interest charged was at a rate of 36 per cent per annum.15 
It is understood from the case that an excessive interest and the special position of 
the party led to the presumption of unconscionability.  Using the new parameters 
of unconscionability, the moneylenders had actually dealing unfairly and gaining 
unfair advantage by way of gross inequality between the parties.
Section 21 of the MA is said as underutilized due to lack of legislature guidance 
and conservatism of both the courts and legal profession (Cheong May Fong, 
2005).  It is submitted that evidence of excessive interest alone for moneylending 
transaction could invoke unconscionability.  The term ‘excessive’ implies that the 
interest charged to the borrower is not just high but also unconscionable.  The 
issue of excessiveness cannot be separated from unconscionability.  It should be 
noted that excessiveness differs among judges as it is subject to government policy, 
overseas market and seasonal condition (Peden, 1982; Ford and Ford, 1985).  Other 
evidence such as special position of the parties only gives it a greater reason for 
law to protect the borrowing party.
The doctrine of unconscionability is a practical tool to overcome the problem 
of illegal moneylending.  The illegal moneylenders often charged exorbitant 
interest rate and use intimidating methods of recovering the loans in cases of non-
repayment by the borrowers.  Contract by the illegal or unlicensed moneylender 
is unenforceable under section 15 of the MA.  Section 15 implies that consumers 
need statutory protection against unconscionable practices of illegal moneylenders. 
The effect of unenforceable contract is found in the CA.  Unenforceable contract 
is void and any person who has received any advantage is bound to restore or 
compensate the person from whom he received it.16
Statutorily, unlicensed moneylender is different from exempted moneylender. 
In Kok Swee Chin v. General Factoring and Credit Sdn Bhd,17 credit companies 
granted exemption from the MA can charge any rate of interest they wish and operate 
from anywhere they like.  This practice, of course, could lead to unconscionability. 
In Aseam Credit Sdn Bhd v Eminent Avenue Sdn Bhd18 the Court of Appeal seemingly 
14 (1918) 1 FMSLR 348.
15 S. 17A of the MA prescribes the interest for secured loan is not more than 12% p.a. and for unsecured 
loan is not more than 18% p.a.
16 Ss. 2(g) and 66 of the CA.
17 [2004] 6 CLJ 101 HC.
18  [2008] 1 CLJ 12.
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place a strict application of section 2A of the MA, unlike Kok Swee Chin’s case, in 
order to ensure that the interest of the borrowers is protected.  A mere letter from 
the Ministry promising an exemption is not valid.  The companies claiming being 
exempted from the MA must show that the exemption has been gazetted.  The 
decision in Aseam’s case shows that statutory provision prevails in courts.  The 
case also gives a subtle reminder to the authority that unconscionable practice could 
occur in moneylending transactions if the authority giving the exemption to the 
credit companies overlooked the requirements for exemption or failed to oversee 
the activities of these credit companies.
Pawnbrokingii. 
The conventional pawnbroking business is governed under the Pawnbrokers Act 
1972 (PA).  The dealings in pawnbroking could confusedly become a moneylending 
if the pawnbrokers received money or deposit from members of the public in return 
of a higher interest to attract the depositors and then use the deposits to finance 
their pawnbroking businesses.  However, in Yeep Mooi v Chu Chin Hua & Ors19, 
the contention that the depositor was a moneylender was set aside by Salleh Abas 
FJ as the depositor’s main business was as a seamstress, not moneylending.  The 
court also found that the pawnshop owner, upon receiving the deposits from 41 
persons including the appellant, was carrying on a borrowing business illegally. 
The transactions were void and unenforceable.  The appellant, nevertheless, was 
allowed to recover her money after the court agreed that she had placed her money 
on deposit in good faith without ever suspecting that the transaction was unlawful 
by any other law.
In pawnbroking transactions, consumers who wished to get quick and 
convenient source of credit without much formality would pawn their valuable 
belongings at a price that is usually low than the actual price of the goods.  However, 
the common problem faced by consumers is the high interest rate.  The rate of 
interest of 24% per annum allowed under the law continues to be rather high20 as 
the loans given out are more than covered by the value of the collateral.  According 
to Salleh Abas FJ in Yeep Mooi’s case:
“It is true that pawnbroking business is still required to satisfy the need 
of the poor; but surely the system as we have today lends itself to their 
oppression.  The interest charged is exorbitant, in the region of 24% 
per annum despite the fact that the loan is accompanied by the pledge 
of articles usually far in excess of the loan it advances….  In practice 
because the high rate of interest which keeps on accumulating, the 
19 [1960] 1 LNS 169.
20 Pawnbrokers (Control & Licensing) Regulation 2004; PU(A) 317/2004, regulation 17.
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pawner is unable to find money to redeem the article as it becomes more 
expensive to do so than buying a new one.  And so the article remains 
unredeemed and the loan unpaid, thereby giving right to the pawnshop 
to sell the article to satisfy its loan and keep the excess proceeds.”21
It should be noted that by using the word “oppression” in the learned judge’s 
statement above, it implies that charging 24% per annum enables the pawnshop 
owner to gain an unfair advantage by manipulating the inequality of bargaining 
position of the pawner.  This is a clear instance of unconscionable practice which 
needs to be reconsidered by the legislature.  In fact, the interest rate charged is 
higher than what is chargeable under the MA.
Another common complaint is that gold objects when pawned are not 
weighed and hence the weight of which is not recorded in pawn ticket or receipt. 
Subsequently, any complaints by consumers that the pawnshop owners had skimmed 
gold from the objects could not be verified.  This dishonest and unethical practice 
is meant to obtain unfair advantage over the pawner.  Such an act is also classified 
as unconscionable.
It is also unlawful for a person to pawn or attempt to pawn an article belonging 
to other person without his knowledge or consent.  The PA clearly prohibits this 
unethical practice under section 28.  Although the PA is silent in addressing that 
a particular practice could become unconscionable, it is still understandable that 
the PA protects the consumers from unconscionability by ordering the delivery 
of a pawned article that has been lost or dishonestly obtained or acquired to the 
owner.
Hire-Purchaseiii. 
Sale credit such as the hire-purchase contracts does not fall under the Moneylenders 
Act.  Hire-purchase is a contractual arrangement whereby the owner agrees to let 
his goods for a stipulated period and payment arrangements to the hirer who may 
opt to return the goods and terminate the contract, or purchases the goods on the 
completion of the required periodic payments.  A simple hire contains no such 
option.  A hire-purchase agreement that involves consumer is governed by the 
Hire-Purchase Act 1967 (HPA).
Closer to hire-purchase arrangement that does not fall under the HPA is a 
lease arrangement.  In Credit Corporation (M) Bhd v KM Basheer Ahamed KM 
Maghdoom Mohideen & Anor22, the appellant leased a photostat copier machine 
under a lease agreement to the respondents.  The respondents suffered business 
21  [1960] 1 LNS 169 at 174-175.
22  [1985] CLJ (Rep) 94.
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losses occasioned by defects in the machine and as a result of this stopped 
payments of the monthly instalments.  The appellant repossessed the machine and 
claimed the whole amount of the monthly rentals unpaid as per schedule to the 
lease arrangement, storage and custody charges.  The Federal Court judges held 
that Clause 9 of the agreement that placed the respondents’ liability to continue 
paying the rentals notwithstanding the occurrence of any defect in the machine 
is clearly one-sided in terms and unconscionable in effect.23  The appellant had 
committed a breach of a lease in failing to dispose of the machine by means of a 
bona fide sale.
Like the MA, section 33 of the HPA also empowers the court to re-open 
transaction that is harsh and unconscionable.  This position implies that 
unconscionable practices could occur in hire-purchase arrangements.  However, 
as pointed out by Cheong May Fong (2005), section 33 is also underutilized by 
the courts.  Despite this finding, the doctrine of unconscionability is still a relevant 
doctrine to control unconscionable and unethical practices in hire-purchase 
transactions.  In Chong Seng Yong v Credit Corp. (M) Bhd, the purpose of enacting 
section 16(1) and regulation 3(1) on the formality of repossession “was to provide 
protection to hirers against harsh and unconscionable practices of certain owners 
who are without scruples.”24
According to Yap Kon Lim (2003), complaints are common on repossession 
fees and storage fees.  The fee varies from hirer to hirer and from circumstance to 
circumstance and totally beyond the borrower’s control.  Section 16A allows these 
fees to be charged to the hirer who fails to return goods after 21 days has lapsed 
as per notice in the Fourth Schedule of the HPA.  This means that hirers are often 
placed at disadvantage positions because of the inequality of bargaining positions 
between the hirers and owners.  However, the practice of charging repossession 
and storage fees would only become unethical and unconscionable if owners of 
goods are charging excessive fees to the hirer.  In other words, the owners of goods 
abused their stronger or superior bargaining position and caused the bargains as 
no longer reasonable and fair.
Sale and Purchase of Housingiv. 
The Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 (HDA) is a piece 
of social legislation to protect house purchasers in their relationship with housing 
developers.25  It is raised in Kheng Soon Finance Bhd v MK Retnam Holdings Sdn 
Bhd; Bhagat Singh, Surain Singh & Ors (Interveners) that those who entered into 
23  1985] CLJ (Rep) 94 at 96.
24  [1982] CLJ 428 at 430.
25  Energoprojek (M) Holdings v PP [1996] 4 CLJ 571 at 575.
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contract in contravention of the HDA is illegal as it infringes public policy.26  In 
other words, it is unethical for the party to go against the HDA and it is a sign of 
lack of good faith that a party is imposing contractual terms in contravention of 
the HDA.  Such situation leads to unconscionability.
In Alexander John Shek Kwok Bun v Rich Avenue Sdn Bhd & Anor, the court 
acknowledged that the use of standard agreements in this day and age has eroded 
the basic principle of freedom of contract.  The court viewed that it is “duty bound 
to be vigilant to ensure that consumers are not being burdened with unconscionable 
terms.”27  In this case, the plaintiff is required to pay the entire full purchase 
price before he can get vacant possession of the property.  On the face of it, this 
is a reasonable term.  However vacant possession is defined as not including the 
connection of water and electricity supply to the property.  Nor does it mean that 
the plaintiff can take physical possession of the property until such time that the 
certificate of fitness is issued by the appropriate authorities.  In short, what it means 
is that the plaintiff is obliged to fulfill his obligation by paying the entire purchase 
price without the reciprocal obligation on the part of the defendant in delivering 
vacant possession of the property.  Not only that there is no timeline in which the 
defendant is required to connect the water and electricity supply to the property, 
there is also no timeline set out in the agreement for the defendant to obtain the 
certificate of fitness from the appropriate authorities for the property.  The court held 
that these terms are absurd and among others stated that these standard form terms 
are unconscionable as ordinary consumers are being burdened by these terms.
Unconscionable practice was also found in Tan Yang Long & Anor v Newacres 
Sdn Bhd28 where the standard form terms prescribed that no matter how long 
delivery is delayed, no damages need be paid until the day when the building is 
completed and vacant possession is delivered.  This standard form term was held 
unconscionable as the defendant is urging the plaintiff to wait indefinitely without 
knowing when completion will take place.
STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF CONSCIONABLE 
CONDUCT
Gopal Sri Ram JCA acknowledged in Saad Marwi v Chan Hwan Hwa & Anor29 
that many Malaysians are still vulnerable in matters of commerce and that statutory 
protection afforded to Malaysian consumers is still insufficient.  In Malaysia, 
unconscionability is known through the term ‘unconscionable transaction’.  This 
term is found in section 16(3) of the Contracts Act, 1950 (the ‘CA’) and the above-
26 [1996] 4 CLJ 52.
27 [2008] 7 CLJ 754 at 774 and 775.
28 [1992] 3 CLJ (Rep) 666; [1992] 1 CLJ 211.
29 [2001] 3 CLJ 98.
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mentioned section 21(2) of the MA and section 33 of the HPA.  However, the 
existence of these statutory provisions does not caused unconscionability to be 
known as a recognized doctrine of its own.
According to section 16(3) of the CA, the notion “unconscionable” is 
a circumstance that could lead to the presumption of undue influence.  The 
importance of the notion is also overshadowed by other tests of undue influence, 
namely the domination of will and the gain of unfair advantage.  Applying the 
new parameters of unconscionability to all forms of contract would certainly lead 
to a clearer understanding of the doctrine of unconscionability.  It would be very 
enticing to suggest a separate section for unconscionability in the CA.  However, 
suggesting a separate section for unconscionability in the CA would ultimately 
lead to reconstructuring the whole CA.  This is because the appropriate place for 
a section on unconscionability is only in Part III of the CA but Part III is already 
tied up to the notions of consent and consideration.
It is important to note that section 16(3) is limited to unconscionability arising 
from domination of will and it should remain that way.  However, in order to make 
sure that section 16(3) will not be the dominating concept in unconscionability, it is 
pertinent to have an illustration.  The illustration will show the limit of section 16(3) 
of the CA that it is limited to unconscionability arising from domination of will. 
The other broader parameters of unconscionability should be developed, evolved 
and recognized by courts to apply within the general law of contract.
For a specific law of contracts such as franchising and consumer contracts, the 
legislature should transform conscionability into a recognised duty and become 
mandatory in common clauses in the agreements.  The followings are several 
alternative methods to achieve this purpose apart from revising section 16(3) of 
the CA:
Unconscionable Bargains as Implied Termsi. 
The statutes could provide a format for unconscionable bargains as implied terms. 
They can follow this method as in sections 14 to 17 of the SGA, Part V and VIII of 
the CPA and section 7 of the 1967 Act  that have implied conditions and warranties 
in every agreement.
Requirement to Avoid Unconscionable Bargains in Prescribed Common ii. 
Clauses
The statutes could provide the duty to avoid unconscionable bargains as a 
requirement of prescribed common clauses.  They can follow this method as in 
section 11 of the HDA whereby the parties have to follow the conditions prescribed 
by the government in the sale and purchase of houses.  The statutes can impose the 
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duty to avoid unconscionable bargains as conditions to be explicitly prescribed in 
each and every agreement.
Requirement to Avoid Unconscionable Bargains as Mandatory Clauseiii. 
The statutes could directly include the requirement to avoid unconscionable bargains 
as mandatory clause.  The definition of unconscionable bargain is according to 
this paper submission.  As a result, the parameters of unconscionability become 
mandatory in every agreement.
Requirement Not to Contract Outiv. 
As it is a duty for the parties to avoid unconscionable bargain, any parties to the 
agreements cannot contract out these implied terms.  It is also recommended that 
the statutes could include some illustrations to the provisions.  The illustrations 
should highlight the common forms of unconscionable and unethical bargains in 
the transactions.
It is deemed that all the above ways of dealing with unconscionable and 
unethical practices require the intervention of law.  The legislature can follow the 
above recommendations on transforming conscionability into a recognized duty.
CONCLUSION
Unconscionability is the situation whereby the contract is entered into, negotiated 
or obtained by a party who lacks conscience for justice.  In the situation where 
there is no fair dealing negotiated, no good faith between the parties, inequality 
where there is abuse of position or unfair advantage taken or undue influence, the 
contract becomes unconscionable.  The contract is a bargain, so when the bargain is 
unconscionable it becomes unconscionable bargain.  Thus, unconscionable bargain 
is the result of all these factors.
Conscionability does not mean fairness; as in achieving conscionability of a 
contract, the courts may not necessarily determine whether the contract is fair or 
not but whether it is conscionable or not.  For example, ‘A’ who has no knowledge 
of the deposit of gold below his land sells his land to ‘B’ who has knowledge of 
the deposit. ‘A’ sells to ‘B’ RM 3 million whereas it could reach RM 8 million. 
‘B’’s concealment is not fraud (caveat emptor).  His act of concealment is also 
considered conscionable because he has invested some amount of money to 
investigate the land before buying, which ‘A’ did not.  The transaction between 
‘A’ and ‘B’ is conscionable so far as the parties are considered at arm’s length and 
there is no duty to disclose.  When there arise a duty to disclose, either imposed 
by common law such as in insurance and partnership or statutorily such as in the 
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FA, the conscionability at the procedural stage is supported by the requirement to 
deal fairly, reasonably and honestly or in other words in good faith.
After a review of the cases which reflect quite a positive attitude on the part 
of the judges on unconscionable bargain by applying several equitable rules such 
as fairness, the speed and expediency of changes that are required may be too slow 
mainly because judges only contribute towards formulating new laws as when 
cases come to them.  Moreover, some difficult decisions that are too rigid and not 
favorable to the idea of contractual justice cannot be removed under our current 
system of stare decisis.  So, this obviously leaves us with the most effective option 
to expedite reform of the law through legislative intervention by the Parliament. 
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